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I. INTRODUCTION 
The widespread use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in domestic law enforcement is immi-
nent.  Every police department, chief, and beat officer in the United States 
dreams of the ability to have eyes everywhere—a constant panoramic view 
of every angle in every precinct with the ability to instantly zoom in on 
suspicious behavior.  That ability is available now.  And it is on sale, cheap.  
The problem is regulatory uncertainty surrounding operations of UAVs in 
American airspace, and no one wants to be the guinea pig.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), tasked with ensuring the safe and orderly 
operation of aircraft, is regulating UAV operations of the kind that domestic 
law enforcement wants.  The FAA has effectively stopped domestic law 
enforcement agencies from operating small UAVs in their operations 
without running afoul of FAA regulations for now.  Nonetheless, the law 
enforcement industry is clamoring for the new tools.  Finally, use of small 
UAVs raises potentially thorny Fourth Amendment issues and will not go 
unnoticed by lawyers and civil liberty groups.  The privacy issues raised by 
the potential ubiquity of UAVs go beyond the current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
This article will begin first with a discussion of the problem back-
ground, canvass the operational abilities of current UAVs, and explore the 
regulatory and constitutional limitations affecting their use.  Second, the 
article will illustrate the burdensome process a local law enforcement 
agency must endure to utilize UAVs in operations and avoid administrative 
enforcement action.  Third, the article will assess recent regulatory develop-
ments in regard to the domestic operation of small UAVs.  The article will 
conclude by exploring where Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might go 
when society is faced with continuous, ubiquitous airborne surveillance. 
II. PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
Every technological step forward in remote sensing raises potential 
Fourth Amendment issues, and the implications of law enforcement and 
executive use of ever cheaper and more numerous surveillance tools are not 
fleshed out until the highest courts profess their opinions, sometimes years 
later.  And in the interim, even newer technologies have rendered the 
original technologies and questions obsolete.  Even legislative oversight is 
ineffective—a deliberative organ‟s skills at playing technological “whack-
a-mole” are futile when compared to the rate of industry advancement. 
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The societal questions raised by today‟s law enforcement use of 
cutting-edge surveillance technology in day-to-day operations will need to 
be answered at the same level they are raised—on the ground.  There is no 
precedent that squarely addresses privacy implications of governmental use 
of a technology that allows essentially permanent, multi-dimensional, 
multi-sensory surveillance of citizens twenty-four hours per day.  A hypo-
thetical example approaching that kind of surveillance ability would be a 
police officer‟s access to a Google Earth1-like display, with a point of view 
that could be moved or zoomed anywhere in three dimensions, coupled 
with real-time visual, audio, thermal, or other sensing.  God-like sensory 
omniscience, in other words.  Individual law enforcement officers‟ abilities 
could be multiplied with a flock of small UAVs, exponentially increasing 
the state‟s power to continually monitor its citizenry. 
Our Constitutional jurisprudence, demographics, and technological 
ability to remotely sense almost anyone, anywhere, at anytime, seem to be 
the ingredients necessary for a police state.  But interestingly, law enforce-
ment has not taken full advantage of the potential tools available to them—
perhaps for regulatory impediments, for budgetary constraints, or to avoid 
running afoul of the Constitution.  At any rate, permanent, ubiquitous 
surveillance is not the stuff of fiction anymore.  So what could usher us into 
the brave new world of a big brother-like security state?  Off-the-shelf tech-
nology, an updated regulatory scheme, and outdated Fourth Amendment 
cases could. 
A. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE UAVS AND SYSTEMS 
Although Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Aerial Systems 
are not new,2 their use in domestic law enforcement is new and imminent.  
The UAS industry, regulators, and researchers are moving closer to adopt-
ing rules and regulations that would allow the use of UAVs in civil air-
space, but the present state of affairs resembles an aeronautical Wild West. 
Production of civilian UAVs has exploded in recent years, and is fore-
cast to continue to grow exponentially.3  Once almost the exclusive purview 
 
1. See Google Earth, www.earth.google.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (illustrating potential 
surveillance capabilities). 
2. For example, the Ryan Aeronautical Company developed the Firebee in 1951, which was 
a jet-powered target drone.  It was one of the most widely-used target drones ever built. 
3. Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total Over $80 Billion in its Just 
Released 2010 UAV Market Profile and Forecast, PRNEWSWIRE.COM, Feb. 1, 2010, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/teal-group-predicts-worldwide-uav-market-will-total-
over-80-billion-in-its-just-released-2010-uav-market-profile-and-forecast-83233947 html (“Teal 
Group‟s 2010 market study estimates that UAV spending will more than double over the next 
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of military operations, UAVs designed for civilian use, such as atmospheric 
research, agricultural operations, spying, and information relay are available 
for purchase now.  A representative example is the MLB Company‟s BAT-
4, an off-the-shelf ready to fly UAS: 
Bat 4 is a complete man-portable UAV system that operates auton-
omously and delivers high quality video imagery.  A ready-to-fly 
aircraft with standard sensor payload and complete ground station 
is available starting at US $35,000.  The Bat 4 UAV has a wing-
span of 13 feet, weighs only 55 to 100 pounds, and can fly for up 
to 8 hours (12 with optional wing tanks).4 
Its advertised uses include “[u]rban monitoring” and “[a]erial map-
ping.”5  Although it looks rather ungainly, its ability to loiter for up to 12 
hours over urban areas, peering down with a three-dimensional gimbaled 
camera capable of magnification by 25 times in any weather conditions or 
at night, thanks to its infrared camera, gives it advantages far beyond those 
of human piloted aircraft.  By way of comparison, a police department 
wishing to purchase a standard Bell model 206 helicopter for aerial sur-
veillance can expect to pay $875,000 up front for a basic machine capable 
of a maximum of 4.5 hours of flight time, requiring two or more crew-
members, and costing approximately $500 per hour to operate.6  For the 
same price as the Bell 206 helicopter, that department could instead 
purchase around 40 Bat-4 UAVs plus launcher and associated equipment 
that require zero trained crewmembers to operate and costs less than $5 per 
hour to operate, per aircraft.7 
That was but one example of how relatively inexpensive UASs are 
compared to manned aircraft.  Many manufacturers of UAS offer similar 
products, and law enforcement agencies around the country have calculated 
that it would be entirely feasible to equip each patrol officer‟s car with a 
UAS in the trunk.  The potential uses of a UAS in tandem with a patrol 
officer are many.  The UAV could fly along several hundred feet above the 
patrol car, giving the officer a real-time bird‟s eye view of the situations 
developing around his or her patrol beat.  The need for risky high-speed 
pursuit of fleeing suspects would be eliminated, since the UAV could 
 
decade from current worldwide UAV expenditures of $4.9 billion annually to $11.5 billion, 
totaling just over $80 billion in the next ten years.”). 
4. The MLB Company, http://spyplanes.com/pages_new/products htm (follow “Bat 4” 
hyperlink to find downloadable PDF file) (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
5. Id. 
6. See Bell Helicopter, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/commercial/bell206B-
3.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
7. See The MLB Company, http://spyplanes.com/pages_new/products htm (last visited Mar. 
8, 2010). 
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simply track the suspect from above.  Or several UAVs could be posted to 
orbit and monitor suspected drug distribution locations, freeing officers for 
other duties until enough evidence is gathered with the UAV sensors to 
obtain a search warrant. 
Those examples are relatively simple in keeping with the simplicity 
and ease of use of a small UAV.  Most small UAVs are flown via “point 
and click” on a laptop computer, with the vehicle itself controlled by its 
own internal autopilot, receiving guidance instructions via a radio or satel-
lite link.8  Some larger UAVs can be hand flown by qualified pilots, but it is 
not necessary to be a trained pilot to operate a small, autonomous UAV.  
Operators merely select the operation they wish the UAV to perform, 
whether that is orbiting over a single location, tracking a moving target, or 
patrolling a set area.  The newest technologies allow the UAV to monitor an 
area for certain interesting activity and then track that activity when it 
begins, wherever it goes, using artificial intelligence programs in its flight 
computers.  Those are more expensive, experimental technologies, but they 
are quickly becoming commercially available.9 
The currently available UAS technologies have given law enforcement 
officers tools never available before now.  The ability to continuously mon-
itor suspected criminals from above in all weather and visibility conditions 
multiplies law enforcement‟s executive power and abilities.  Legislative 
oversight, however, is lagging behind the commercial development and 
marketing of these new tools.  The current regulatory scheme is inadequate 
to deal with the novel issues raised by use of UAVs in law enforcement. 
B. CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY SCHEME 
The current regulatory scheme in place in the domestic U.S. airspace is 
a mixture of constitutional jurisprudence and administrative regulation.  
Although it was not long ago that the Supreme Court rejected the idea of 
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, where a landowner owned every-
thing above his or her property out to the edge of the universe,10 the courts 
are in general agreement that landowners own as much airspace above their 
property as they can reasonably use,11 and everything else is akin to a 
“public highway.”12  The seminal “ownership” cases are factually limited to 
airport expansion or construction nearby, with the result that aircraft end up 
 
8. E.g., Insitu Co., http://www.insitu.com/scaneagle (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
9. See P.W. SINGER., WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 355-356 (Penguin Press 2009). 
10. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946). 
11. Id. at 264. 
12. Id. at 261. 
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flying unreasonably low over a house, or the airport‟s presence results in 
restrictive zoning regulations.13  The constitutional limits on ownership of 
airspace generally limit the remedy of an aggrieved property owner to an 
action in inverse condemnation14 or to a challenge of the zoning restrictions 
under the Fifth Amendment takings clause.15  Therefore, contemporary 
constitutional takings claims for flight over a person‟s property are unlikely 
to survive outside close proximity to an airport, and even then, federal law 
and airspace regulations favor public use of airspace.16 
The Air Commerce Act17 allows the flying public the use of all public 
airspace above the minimum safe altitudes and use of lower altitudes for 
takeoff and landing.18  Minimum safe altitudes are generally defined as no 
lower than 500 feet above the surface generally, or no closer than 500 feet 
horizontally and vertically from any person, structure, vessel, or vehicle, 
and no lower than 1,000 feet above congested areas19 for fixed wing 
aircraft, and “less than the minimums [for airplanes] if the operation is 
conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface” for rotor 
wing aircraft (helicopters).20 
Those, and myriad other operating regulations, are promulgated by the 
FAA and apply to all aircraft in the United States.21  The FAA defines 
“aircraft” as “a device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the 
air.”22  This broad definition could strictly encompass paper airplanes 
folded by restless students, but the FAA has made a practical policy deci-
sion to essentially ignore small model aircraft and other similar things.  
Although no definition currently exists for what a “model aircraft” is, if 
model aircraft operators fly below 400 feet above the surface and stay away 
from airports, they generally can safely ignore all the regulations that apply 
to full-scale aircraft operators.23 
In response to the production surge of small UAVs, the FAA has 
promulgated a series of orders, which will be discussed in later sections, 
regarding the operation of UAVs as a temporary stopgap, since many 
 
13. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 256; Griggs v. Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 84 (1962); Sneed v. 
Riverside, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
14. See Allegheny, 369 U.S. at 84-90. 
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
16. See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
17. Ch. 6, 44 Stat. 2119 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 171-84 (repealed 1983)). 
18. See id. ch. 6, § 180, 44 Stat. at 2122 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 180 (repealed 1983)). 
19. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)-(c) (2009). 
20. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d). 
21. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a). 
22. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1. 
23. See U.S. Dep‟t of Transp., Federal Aviation Admin., Advisory Circular 91-57, Model 
Aircraft Operating Standards, 1981, available at http://rgl.faa.gov/. 
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operators have made the easy logical deduction that a device such as the 
BAT-4 would qualify as a model aircraft and hence could be flown with 
impunity under the Model Aircraft Operating Standards.  Of course, UAVs 
come in a wide range of sizes, but this paper will focus on small sized 
UAVs to stay with the hypothetical example of a police patrol car equipped 
with a UAV in the trunk. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON AERIAL SURVEILLANCE 
Before examining the legal issues surrounding operation of a UAV in 
domestic American airspace, an examination of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence24 will assist in fleshing out the limits of what surveillance tech-
niques might be employed by police using UAVs and withstand constitu-
tional muster.  In the landmark case Katz v. U.S.,25 the defendant was 
convicted using evidence obtained by police placing an electronic listening 
device on the outside of a public phone booth the defendant used.26  The 
Court rejected the government‟s argument that there had been no Fourth 
Amendment violation because no physical intrusion into the phone booth 
occurred.27  In doing so, the Court changed track in its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, moving away from the notion that a trespass was a necessary 
ingredient in a Fourth Amendment violation28 because the “Fourth Amend-
ment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”29  Even though the phone booth was in a public 
place, the defendant still retained some reasonable expectation of privacy—
“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”30  However, the Court 
noted in the same breath that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.”31  Justice Harlan highlighted that subjective reasoning in 
his concurrence, where he articulated the following two part rule:  “first that 
 
24. Several commentators have argued for private tort actions (such as intrusion, trespass, 
nuisance, etc.) for unwanted remote sensing of property.  See, e.g. Craig, Brian, Online Satellite 
and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. REV. 547, 557-58 (2007).  But no private tort 
action yet will lie for remotely sensing a private property owners land, either by another private 
actor or a government actor.  Therefore, this article‟s scope will remain focused on constitutional 
claims and government actors. 
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
27. Id. at 351. 
28. See Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942); Olmstad v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 466 
(1928) (both overruled by Katz). 
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
30. Id. at 351-52 (alteration in original). 
31. Id. at 351. 
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a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
„reasonable.‟”32  The Court has seized upon that logic, holding that a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment generally occurs “when an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed.”33 
Surveillance by UAV combines surveillance by remote sensing and 
aerial observation, both areas having been previously explored in context of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Katz was essentially the first remote sensing case, 
since the evidence was obtained by police placing an electronic listening 
device on the outside of a public phone booth.34  Remote sensing, or 
gathering data from a distance, encompasses a broad range of tactics from 
simple visual observation to audio enhancement as in Katz to highly 
technical methods such as forward looking infrared systems (FLIR). 
Remote sensing, regardless of the methodology used, falls into two 
categories for Fourth Amendment purposes:  “open fields” and “curtilage.”  
Open fields include public areas and private property that “do not provide 
the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is 
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”35  
Surveillance of open fields, or activities in open fields, simply will never 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Surveillance of curtilage, on the other 
hand, may implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Curtilage is a legal 
“penumbra” surrounding a home, where surveillance may implicate the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.36  But the fact that “the area is within 
the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.  The Fourth Amend-
ment protection of the home has never been extended to require law 
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public 
thorough-fares.”37  Essentially, surveillance of an area by remote sensing 
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if it is done from a public van-
tage point where law enforcement officers can make open observations. 
 
32. Id. at 361. 
33. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
35. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
36. U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).  Four factors determine whether an area is 
“curtilage:”  “[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, 
and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Id. 
at 301. 
37. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
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Regarding aerial observation from navigable airspace,
38
 the Court has 
specifically held that surveillance of a home‟s backyard by aircraft39 or 
helicopter40 is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, nor is photo-
graphing a private industrial complex from public airspace.41  The Court‟s 
holdings form an “aerial surveillance trilogy”42 and the basis for aerial 
surveillance Fourth Amendment law.  In the first aerial surveillance case, 
California v. Ciraolo,43 police flew a fixed-wing aircraft over the 
defendant‟s backyard at 1,000 feet, the minimum safe altitude required by 
Federal Aviation Regulations, and observed marijuana plants with naked 
eye observation.44  Police used aerial surveillance because the backyard was 
not visible from the ground due to an extensive fencing system.45  The 
aerial surveillance formed the basis for a search warrant, and police later 
found marijuana plants upon a physical search.46  Although the defendant 
had fenced his yard, creating an expectation of privacy, the Court concluded 
that a ground fence does not extend any expectation of privacy to be free 
from aerial surveillance because routine flights exposed the backyard to 
public view.47 
The Court extended Ciraolo’s reach in Florida v. Riley.48  Similar to 
Ciraolo, the defendant enclosed his greenhouse to prevent ground-level 
observation.49  Officers used a helicopter, flying at 400 feet overhead, to 
peer through openings in the greenhouse; they determined marijuana was 
growing inside.50  The Court followed Ciraolo in holding that the defendant 
 
38. “„Navigable airspace‟ means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed 
by regulations . . . including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of 
aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2009). 
39. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-214.  In this case, the observation by aircraft took place within 
public navigable airspace. Id. at 213. 
40. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).  In this case, the helicopter was flying within 
navigable airspace. Id. at 451. 
41. Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).  In this case, the aircraft which the 
photographs were taken was at all times within lawfully navigable airspace. Id. at 229. 
42. See generally California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Reilly, 488 U.S. 445 
(1989); Dow Chem v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986).  The “aerial surveillance trilogy” refers to 
California v. Ciraolo, Florida v. Reilly, and Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S. read together as a whole. 
43. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
44. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 209-10. 
47. Id. at 215. 
48. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
49. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450. 
50. Id. at 448. 
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had no reasonable expectation of privacy because a helicopter flying in 
navigable airspace was a routine, expected occurrence.51 
Finally, in Dow Chemical Company v. U.S.,52 the Court extended 
further the authority of law enforcement officers to fly over private com-
mercial areas that would otherwise be constitutionally protected from 
physical surveillance.53  Dow had also extensively enclosed its property to 
prevent ground-level observation and even went so far as to investigate any 
low-flying aircraft, even though it had no authority to do so.54  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), suspecting regulatory violations, 
hired a commercial pilot to fly over Dow‟s property to take aerial photos.55  
The EPA did not procure a search warrant prior to the flight.56  Although 
the Court noted that “[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed 
area would raise significantly different questions, because „the business-
man, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about 
his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private 
commercial property,‟”57 the Court held that “such an industrial complex is 
more comparable to an open field and as such it is open to the view and 
observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace.”58 
Under the “aerial surveillance trilogy” canvassed above, it seems that 
aerial surveillance, regardless of the method, of private or commercial 
property from aircraft lawfully in navigable airspace is not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment, because there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in any area in open view from above—regardless of whether it is 
located in an open field or within the curtilage.  Each Court opinion in the 
trilogy focused on an area visible from above.  But recall that the “Fourth 
Amendment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against unreason-
able searches and seizures.”59  The Court seems to have recently returned to 
that idea in Kyllo v. U.S.60  In Kyllo, police used a thermal imaging device 
 
51. Id. at 450-51.  While operating a helicopter at 400 feet over a residential dwelling may be 
technically allowed by regulation, it is neither prudent nor safe.  The noise and disruption 
produced would likely result in complaints and lawsuits, and the pilot‟s options for safe landing in 
the event of an emergency are severely limited at that low altitude.  Low-level operations are not 
as routine or expected as the Ciraolo Court thinks, but the Court blessed such operations as such. 
52. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
53. Dow Chem Co., 476 U.S. at 234. 
54. Id. at 229. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 237 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)). 
58. Id. at 239. 
59. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
60. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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to detect unusual amounts of heat radiating from the defendant‟s home.61  
Although the Court framed its holding around the principle that such 
penetrating searches are unconstitutional absent a search warrant as a limit 
on technological encroachment of privacy, the Court added the caveat “at 
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use.”62  Presumably, once a certain technology is in general public use, a 
search like that in Kyllo would not be a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Therefore, the test seems to turn on whether Wal-Mart sells it or 
not.63  Notwithstanding this caveat, the Kyllo Court insisted that the techno-
logical tools employed by the government were irrelevant and focused 
instead on whether the defendant (and society) had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the activities observed or information gathered.64 
But society‟s reasonable expectations of privacy and tolerance for 
invasion of privacy affect the limits of the Fourth Amendment, as the Kyllo 
Court implicitly acknowledged with the same caveat:  “We think that 
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical „intrusion into a constitutionally protected area‟ constitutes a 
search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general 
public use.”65  “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a 
person has a „constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.‟  
Katz posits a two-part inquiry:  first, has the individual manifested a sub-
jecttive expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?  
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?”66  
The cases of the aerial surveillance trilogy were premised upon the question 
of whether flight over the subject property was common at a given altitude.  
And the Court did not hesitate in proclaiming low altitude flight a common 
occurrence and that society should reasonably expect as much.  
Constitutionally, it seems that aerial surveillance by any method of any area 
in open view from any legal altitude does not implicate the Fourth 
 
61. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
62. Id. at 34. 
63. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment 
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1331-35 (2002) (explaining that 
well established technologies can change reasonable expectations of privacy). 
64. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (explaining the need for a rule governing searches and seizures 
that applies despite advancing technology). 
65. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
66. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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Amendment, as long as the technology used to obtain the surveillance 
technology is in general public use and does not penetrate into the home.67 
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT:  HOW TO LEGALLY USE UAVS IN 
SURVEILLANCE (IT‟S NOT GOING TO BE EASY) 
Because aerial surveillance of an area in open view from a legal alti-
tude using technology in general public use that does not penetrate into a 
home does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, it would seem to be a 
simple matter for law enforcement agencies to purchase and use small, 
autonomous UAVs like the BAT-4 or its equivalent described earlier.  But 
the FAA has taken the position that “no person may operate a UAS in the 
National Airspace System without specific authority.”68  The FAA defines 
that specific authority on whether the operation is amateur, public, or 
civil.69  For amateur model aircraft the authority is FAA publication AC 91-
57.70  For UAS operations as a public aircraft the specific authority comes 
by way of a Certificate of Authorization (COA).71  For UAS operations as 
civil aircraft—general public use of aircraft and airspace—the authority is 
granted via a special airworthiness certificate.72 
A. AMATEUR MODEL AIRCRAFT 
As a preliminary matter, no law enforcement agency will succeed in 
arguing that its UAV is essentially an amateur model aircraft, albeit with a 
very sophisticated camera attached, and therefore can be operated with 
impunity under FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-57.73  The FAA intended 
this advisory circular, a single-page non-regulatory opinion, to exclude 
model aircraft operators from federal regulations governing aviation.74  The 
FAA recognized that modelers did not pose a substantial hazard to high-
flying commercial aircraft, and thus directed them to operate below 400 feet 
and to stay away from airports.75  This exception existed because the FAA 
did not want to expend scarce resources on policing such a small, harmless 
niche, as it was. 
 
67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44. 
68. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 
6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91). 
69. Id. 
70. See Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23. 
71. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6690. 
72. Id. 
73. Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. 
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No law enforcement agency will succeed in operating a UAV under 
AC 91-57 because the FAA specifically prohibits it.76  The document and 
its rationale are currently being updated by the FAA because new UAVs are 
much more capable than the model aircraft of yesteryear, raising safety 
concerns.  The FAA has the authority to regulate aircraft operations77 unless 
it elects not to, as with amateur model aircraft.78  An “aircraft” is defined by 
the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:  “Aircraft means a device that 
is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.”79  An amateur model 
aircraft falls under the definition of “aircraft” because it is a device used for 
flight in the air and therefore would ostensibly be regulated by the rules 
provided in Title 14, Section 91 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  Civil 
aircraft operations in the domestic U.S. airspace are regulated by this sec-
tion, which states:  “Except as [otherwise] provided this part prescribes 
rules governing the operation of aircraft (other than moored balloons, kites, 
unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons and ultralight vehicles . . . ) 
within the United States, including the waters within 3 nautical miles of the 
U.S. coast.”80 
Nonetheless, the FAA will likely continue to ignore model aircraft 
operations that fall below certain weight and speed parameters.  Model 
aircraft exceeding the performance capabilities of traditional “amateur” 
model aircraft may soon be regulated by civil aviation regulations in some 
fashion. 
Amateur modelers may currently operate “under the radar,” but are 
subject to enforcement if their models are used for commercial purposes or 
compromise the safety of other aircraft or the public.  “The FAA recognizes 
that people and companies other than modelers might be flying UAS with 
the mistaken understanding that they are legally operating under the 
authority of AC 91-57.  AC 91-57 only applies to modelers, and thus spe-
cifically excludes its use by persons or companies for business purposes.”81  
For the time being, the FAA has decided to limit operation of UAVs to 
public or civil authority. 
 
76. Aviation Safety Unmanned Aircraft Program Office AIR-160, Interim Operational 
Approval Guidance 08-01, 5 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/aircert/ 
designapprovals/uas/reg/media/uas_guidance08-01.pdf. 
77. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a) (2009). 
78. See Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23 (encouraging model aircraft operators to 
comply with safety standards). 
79. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2009). 
80. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a). 
81. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 
6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). 
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B. PUBLIC AIRCRAFT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION 
(COA) 
Since the FAA has prohibited the use of UAVs under AC 91-57 when 
used for business purposes, a law enforcement agency wishing to use UAVs 
in its operations must either operate the aircraft as a public aircraft and 
apply for a COA, or apply for a special Experimental Aircraft certification.  
Of the two, operation as a public aircraft under a COA is currently the only 
viable option, and even it remains overly burdensome.  A COA is essen-
tially a waiver by the FAA allowing operation that would otherwise be a 
violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) if the operations can 
be “conducted at an acceptable level of safety.”82  An example of a regula-
tion that may be waived is FAR 91.113(b), which requires operators of air-
craft to “see and avoid” other aircraft.83  But many UAV operators are 
unable to comply with this regulation by definition—they are not inside the 
aircraft and therefore cannot see or avoid other aircraft.  Therefore, a waiver 
allowing operation might require a ground or airborne observer to be 
present at all times while the UAV is in flight to ensure an acceptable level 
of safety is met. 
The waiver application requires applicants to establish the UASs 
“airworthiness either from FAA certification, a Department of Defense 
airworthiness statement, or by other approved means.  Applicants also have 
to demonstrate that a collision with another aircraft or other airspace user is 
extremely improbable as well as complying with appropriate cloud and 
terrain clearances as required.”84  Additionally, the applicant must describe 
the procedures the pilot and observer must follow.  “The [pilot] is simply 
the person in control of, and responsible for, the UAS.  The role of the 
observer is to observe the activity of the unmanned aircraft and surrounding 
airspace, either through line-of-sight on the ground or in the air by means of 
a chase aircraft.”85  Currently, UAV pilots do not necessarily need to hold 
FAA licensure, depending on the operation, but must be medically qualified 
to act as commercial pilots, as must the observer.86 
The application requires a detailed discussion of launch and recovery 
procedures, contingency plans in the event of loss of control or communica-
tion with the aircraft, fuel requirements, bad weather alternatives, accident 
 
82. Id. 
83. 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Aviation Safety Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, AIR-160, Interim Operational 
Approval Guidance 09-01, 16 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www faa.gov/aircraft/aircert/ 
designapprovals/uas/reg/media/uasguidance08-01.pdf. 
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and incident reporting procedures, and other details.87  Finally, the applicant 
must include graphical representations of much of the above.88  The appli-
cation is then reviewed operationally and technically by the FAA to ensure 
compliance at the acceptable level of safety.  Limitations or other pro-
visions may be imposed as part of the approval process. According to the 
FAA‟s website, “[i]n most cases, FAA will provide a formal response 
within 60 days from the time a completed application is submitted.”89 
Last year, the FAA received 164 COA applications and denied only 
three.90  The FAA continues to be inundated with applications, having re-
ceived 65 as of July 2009.91  The FAA‟s UAS Office in Washington, D.C., 
staffed with five people, estimates a processing time of approximately 60 
days, consistent with its website.92 
In the event of emergency, however, a COA can theoretically be 
granted in as little as one hour.93  An example of an emergency COA is the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) operation of their Predator MQ-
9 UAV over the Red River valley in eastern North Dakota and northwest 
Minnesota during the spring flooding of 2009.  CBP was granted a special 
COA to fly over the flooded Red River and its tributaries from March 22 to 
April 22, 2009.94  The images obtained from the UAV sensors were used by 
the National Weather Center for flood crest prediction and monitoring, and 
by the Department of Homeland Security for emergency response prepared-
ness.95  That example proved to be a valuable political tool for CBP and 
domestic law enforcement proponents of UAVs, but the backlog of COA 
applicants seems to indicate that only emergencies with widespread 
potential harm will be processed quickly.  An ordinary missing person 
search, for example, probably would not merit such expeditious processing 
under the present regulatory scheme. 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA) (Dec. 9, 
2008), available at http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/ato/serviceunits/ 
systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/. 
90. Interview with John Page, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Unmanned Aircraft 
(July 21, 2009). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Certificate of Authorization, Doc.009-EMER-4, available at North Dakota Law Review 
office. 
95. See Predator Drone is on Patrol, Taking Aerial Surveys of Area, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 
25, 2009, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/41869107 html?elr=KArks:DCiUH 
c3E7VnDaycUiD3aPc:Yyc:aUU. 
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C. EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION 
An alternative method of operating a UAV in the national air space 
without a COA is under an Experimental Aircraft Certification.  All aircraft 
that operate in the national air space are required to meet certain minimum 
levels of quality control and redundancy in their manufacturing and produc-
tion processes.96  If an aircraft does not comply with those minimums, 
operations may be restricted.  Experimental aircraft are those aircraft 
traditionally built by non-certified manufacturers or amateur builders them-
selves.  Experimental certification is also sometimes sought by certified 
manufacturers when testing prototype aircraft.  Operations under an experi-
mental certification are restricted to operating over sparsely populated areas 
and away from congested airways, among other factors.97  Obviously, this 
limitation hampers any potential law enforcement use of UAVs for 
surveillance over populated areas.  To date, fifty-four experimental certifi-
cates have been issued for UAVs.98  Several applications have been 
withdrawn by the applicant, but none have been denied a certificate.99 
Both the COA process and the Experimental Certification process are 
burdensome for operators and industry.  However, the COA seems to be the 
method of choice for the main reason that an experimental certificate is 
specific to one aircraft, whereas a COA is for use of certain designated 
airspace by any number of aircraft.  Either way, when a potential operator 
wishes to obtain FAA clearance to fly a UAV in the national air space, he 
or she must comply with either of those limitations or risk enforcement 
action by the FAA. 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The UAS industry is currently facing a bottleneck of regulation. 
Operating a UAV under the guidelines for amateur model aircraft is not an 
option, and the COA process and the experimental certification process are 
burdensome and lengthy absent a public emergency.  Industry, academe, 
and regulators are searching for a new regulatory paradigm to alleviate the 
bottleneck.  Two major recent events bear discussing: the Small Unmanned 
Aircraft System Aviation Rulemaking Committee‟s recommendations and 
the current operations of the MQ-9 Predator by the United States Customs 
and Border Protection on the Canadian-American border. 
 
96. E.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2009) (airworthiness standards). 
97. 14 C.F.R. § 91.319(c) (2009). 
98. Interview with Bruce Tarbart, FAA Aircraft Certification Service (June 2, 2009). 
99. Id. 
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A. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AVIATION 
RULEMAKING COMMITTEE100 
Twenty stakeholder representatives of industry, academe, and govern-
ment met at length to develop a comprehensive set of recommendations for 
small UAS regulatory development in the U.S.  The committee focused on 
balancing risk to the general public and other aircraft with the burden of 
unduly restricting the development of UAS technology.101  In sum, the 
committee recommended that the FAA adopt standards for UAS operations 
that would allow certain kinds of operations in the national air space with-
out special certification or authorization.102  The standards include defini-
tions, operating rules, personnel requirements, aircraft and system 
requirements, and alternative means of complying with the rules.103  All the 
recommendations reflect the general consensus of the committee, unless 
specially annotated where there was less than a general consensus.  If that 
was the case, alternative views were included along with accompanying 
rationale.104  The standards would define and regulate model aircraft and 
divide UASs into multiple categories.105  Model aircraft would be defined 
as those aircraft “operated by hobbyists for the sole purpose of sport, 
recreation, and/or competition.”106  Additionally, model aircraft would be 
limited to a certain mass and speed capability, the specific values of which 
were in conflict.107 
All other UASs would be divided into five groups.  Group I would be 
frangible aircraft weighing less than 2 kg with a maximum speed of 30 
knots air speed at full power, operated at less than 400 feet above the sur-
face.108  Group II includes aircraft weighing less than 2 kg with a maximum 
speed of 60 knots, operated at less than 400 feet above the surface but with 
some notification required in busy airspace.109  Group III includes aircraft 
weighing up to 9 kg with no speed limit, operated up to 700 feet above the 
 
100. U.S. Dep‟t of Transp., Federal Aviation Administration, Order 110.150 (Apr. 10, 2008), 
available at http://www faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/1110.150.pdf. 
101. Small Unmanned Aircraft System Aviation Rulemaking Committee Comprehensive Set 
of Recommendations for UAS Regulatory Development (proposed Apr. 1, 2009) at iii, available 
at http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/avs/offices/air/hq/engineering/uapo/ 
rulemaking/media/sUASARCRecs.pdf. 
102. Id. at iii-iv. 
103. Id. at vii-x. 
104. Id. at iv. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 5. 
107. Id. at 7-8. 
108. Id. at 22-23. 
109. Id. at 25. 
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surface with notification required.110  Group IV includes aircraft weighing 
up to 25 kg with no speed limit, operated up to 1,200 feet above the sur-
face.111  All Group IV aircraft must be operated in uninhabited and remote 
areas, and they will need special permission from the FAA to operate, 
presumably because of their higher mass and velocity and consequent risk 
to others.112  Finally, Group V aircraft are lighter-than-air UASs, and no 
recommendations were made regarding their characteristics and use.113 
Stakeholders are still reacting to the committee‟s recommendations, 
and the reactions are mixed.
114
  Some commentators have expressed con-
cern that operators of small UAVs are getting short shrift.
115
  Others, 
notably larger manufacturers, feel the new regulations will allow UAS 
operations sooner than they would otherwise.
116
  Because of the mixed reac-
tions, FAA is reviewing the committee's recommendations in conjunction 
with a Safety Management System review.117  “The outcome of those 
activities is expected to be a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [NPRM], but 
a definitive timeline for the publishing of the NPRM has not yet been 
established.”118 
B. MQ-9 (PREDATOR) OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN BORDER 
In compliance with an existing COA, Customs and Border Protection is 
operating an MQ-9 Predator UAS in its mission of guarding the U.S. 
borders and law enforcement.119  Concurrently, the University of North 
Dakota is collaborating with several partners in UAS education and 
research.120  Some of the projects include sensing systems to allow UAS 
operations in unrestricted airspace, improvements in sensor platforms, and 
payload testing. UAS operators have informally assisted local law enforce-
ment agencies by surveying a moving vehicle suspected to be trafficking 
 
110. Id. at 27. 
111. Id. at 28-30. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 30. 
114. Interview with Professor Douglas Marshall, member of the rulemaking committee, in 
Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 2009). 
115 See, e.g., DIY Drones Blog, available at http://diydrones.com/profiles/blogs/705844: 
BlogPost:32836 (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
116. See John Croft, AUVSI Special:  Industry raises the UAV ante, FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM, 
Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/08/04/330418/auvsi-special-industry-
raises-the-uav-ante html. 
117. Interview with Bruce Tarbart, FAA Certification Service (June 2, 2009). 
118. Id. 
119. CBP Mission Statement and Core Values, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/ 
guardians xml (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
120. UND Aerospace, http://www.uasresearch.com/home/default.asp?L1=2&a=30 (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
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drugs.121  In addition to appearing effortless, the tracking of suspects is 
excellent training for UAS pilots. 
Notably, the Predator is unable to peer through windows in houses for 
two reasons:  first, infrared sensing is not able to penetrate glass because the 
glass is “cold” relative to the inside of the house, and appears opaque to the 
sensor.  Second, visual sensors are unable to see through the window due to 
light reflection at the angle of sensing used in an airborne sensor.  Because 
of those physical limitations, Predator‟s current sensor technologies as 
directly observed by the author do not violate the principles laid down by 
the aerial surveillance trilogy of cases and Kyllo.  A sensor platform like 
Predator, when operated in navigable airspace, has essentially the same 
capabilities and physical limitations as a human observer in a manned 
aircraft, and hence warrantless surveillance by such a system does not likely 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  In the probable event that more advanced 
sensors are developed that can penetrate opaque walls or roofs, use of such 
an invasive system would require a search warrant under Kyllo. 
V. CONCLUSION—A BRAVE NEW WORLD WATCHED OVER BY 
BIG BROTHER? 
It is easy to lose oneself in wonder at the dizzying parade of new tech-
nologies that allow surveillance of almost any physical area, but it is 
essential to recall the fundamental constitutional principle from Katz, that 
the “Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”122  Even though the current crop of 
UAS sensors do not appear to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the 
question of whether new technologies will violate those principles we hold 
inviolate must be examined. 
In this information age where one can view most street corners or 
houses anywhere in the U.S. at anytime via a “Smartphone” coupled with 
Google Street View, which allows users to “virtually” explore neighbor-
hoods at street level,123 our current Constitutional jurisprudence regarding 
surveillance and privacy may be inadequate because everyone can indeed 
purchase truly sophisticated surveillance tools at Wal-Mart.  Because such 
technology is in general public use, our reasonable expectations of privacy 
under Kyllo seem to be shrinking quickly.  Until now, the sky has been the 
province of the birds and airliners going to faraway places.  Aerial 
surveillance, while not unconstitutional and not unknown, was nonetheless 
 
121. The author has personally observed this cooperation. 
122. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
123. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/help/maps/streetview/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
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relatively rare.  Even though the aerial surveillance trilogy seems to approve 
the use of UAVs in domestic surveillance, “[t]he touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is [still] whether a person has a „constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy.‟”124  And a person‟s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is necessarily subjective.  If a person reasonably 
expects privacy, that person will likely have “exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy [in the object of the challenged search].”125  
When a large enough group of people start to manifest subjective expecta-
tions of privacy, “society [becomes] prepared to recognize [that expecta-
tion] as reasonable,”126 the expectation becomes objective, and courts adopt 
it.  Thus are societal limits on government surveillance created, with no-
tions of what should be public or private fluctuating with the general social 
mores of the time. 
With the current social trend of publicizing private details of life on 
social networks like Facebook,127 MySpace,128 blogs, and Twitter,129 
concurrently with the public fear of terrorism, the subjective expectations of 
individual citizens and the objective expectations of society may lead the 
courts to re-define unreasonable searches and seizures.  Regarding UAVs 
specifically, their eventual use in domestic law enforcement is a near 
certainty.  But the extent of that use is unknown.  It is happening already on 
the northern border of the United States and a ripe market exists.  The use 
of UAVs in domestic law enforcement will not, however, be possible every-
where due to safety concerns or congestion.  The existing federal regula-
tions are inadequate to respond to the demand, and the proposed regulations 
are uncertain at best.  Until the FAA publishes clear guidance for domestic 
UAS operators, the current burdensome system of applying for a regulatory 
waiver will ensure a bottleneck of users for several years at least.  That 
bottleneck will prevent law enforcement from the full use of its new tool 
and effectively foreclose permanent, multi-dimensional, multi-sensory sur-
veillance of citizens twenty-four hours a day.  But when new federal regula-
tions are codified and the bottleneck has passed and every police depart-
ment does indeed have eyes everywhere, our notions of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment and reasonable searches under Kyllo will need to be 
reevaluated.  It seems the state will have the power, both constitutionally 
and technologically, to continually monitor its citizens from above. 
 
124. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
125. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
126. Id. 
127. Facebook, http://www facebook.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
128. MySpace, http://www myspace.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
129. Twitter, http://twitter.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
